DEPENDENT RELATIVE REVOCATION HAS LOST ITS WAY:
BUT IT CAN BE FOUND AND BETTER UNDERSTOOD
by
Frank L. Schiavo1
I

Introduction

II

What is Dependent Relative Revocation

III

Background

IV

When Dependent Relative Revocation
Should Not Be An Issue

V

Application of Dependent Relative
Revocation

VI

Dependent Relative Revocation Going Astray

VII

“Intent” of Dependent Relative Revocation

VIII How Is Intent Determined?
IX

A Coherent Approach to Dependent Relative
Revocation – a Flow Chart

X

Conclusion

1

Associate Professor of Law, Barry University Dwayne O.
Andreas School of Law. B.S. 1956, Wharton School, University of
Pennsylvania; J.D., 1959 Villanova University School of Law;
LL.M. (Taxation), 1965, New York University. The author teaches
in the area of Wills, Trusts & Estates, Contracts, and Federal
Income Tax. He expresses his appreciation to Professors Barry H.
Dubner, Mark A. Summers and Leonard E. Birdsong for their
valuable comments. In addition, he thanks Kevin Wimberly not only
for his technical help but also for his skills in creating the
Flow Chart.

1

I

INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation has lost its

way. After examining many cases, there does not appear to be any
consistency in applying the doctrine. It has been expanded by the
courts to situations far beyond its initial application.
Scholars have suggested that the term be abandoned. The
objective of this article is to show that, not only has the
suggestion that the term be abandoned not gained momentum, but
confirms a conclusion that misapplication of the doctrine has led
to confusion. It offers a Flow Chart in an effort to help
eliminate the doctrine’s misapplication.

II

WHAT IS DEPENDENT RELATIVE REVOCATION?
Simply stated, the doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation

(hereafter DRR) means
that where testator makes a new will revoking
a former valid one, and it later appears that
the new one is invalid, the old will may be
re-established
on
the
ground
that
the
revocation was dependent upon the validity of
the new one, testator preferring the old will
to intestacy.2
2

Stewart v. Johnson, 194 So.869, at p. 870 (Fla. 1940),
citing Redfern, Wills and Administration of Estates in Florida, §
89, p. 121. In Estate of Tennant, 714 P.2d 122, 129 (Mont.1986),
the court holds the testatrix’s will may not be ‘reinstated’...”
Professor Byer (Wills, Trusts and Estates, Examples &
Explanations Second Ed. (2002), Aspen Law & Business, ' 8.6.2)
describes it as a ARomeo and Juliet@ revocation: Romeo=s intent to
kill himself was conditioned on Juliet being dead; he would not
have killed himself had he known Juliet had only taken a potion
to simulate death.
Professor deFuria describes the doctrine as a legal tool “to
protect the testator...from his own folly.” 64 Notre Dame L. Rev.

2

The origins of the doctrine seem to go back to the early
1716 English case of Onions v. Tyrer.3 Professor Warren, in his
important article, Dependent Relative Revocation,4 attributes the
origin of the term to A...Mr. Powell, who in 1788 gave currency
to the phrase.@5 Professor Warren proposes the term be abandoned6
because it is A...loose and misleading...,@7 tending to treat
A...different subjects under a single principle....@8 His
conclusion was that the A...panacea of a sonorous phrase...has
200, 201 (1989).
3

23 Eng. Rep. 1085 (1716).

4

Joseph Warren, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 337 (1920)

5

Id., at p. 337. “This principle, that the effect of the
obliteration, canceling, etc., depends upon the mind with which
it is done, having been pursued in all its consequences, has
introduced another distinction not yet taken notice of; namely,
that of dependent relative revocations, in which the act of
canceling, etc., being done with reference to another act meant
to be an effectual disposition, will be a revocation or not,
according as the relative act is efficacious or not.” Powell on
Devises, 1st Ed., p. 637.
6

It is submitted that Professor Atkinson agrees: “Instead of
this fiction of conditional revocation, it is more realistic to
treat the problem as one of mistake, holding the revocation
absolute or void in accordance with which position the individual
testator would probably have preferred.” Atkinson on Wills 2nd
Ed. (1953), § 88, p. 452.
7

Joseph Warren, supra, footnote 4, at p. 338.

8

Id., at p. 338. See also Page, Parker & Schoenblum, Page on
the Law of Wills (2003), §21.57: “This term has been criticized
for the very reason that it enables these topics to be grouped
together.”

3

only tended to obscure the common law...@ and led to confusion.9
An historical approach and background of the doctrine show
its original intent.

III

BACKGROUND
In Onions v. Tyrer,10 the testator properly executed a first

will, and four years later made another that expressly revoked
the first. The testator=s wife, at his direction, then tore up
the first will. The court held that the second will could not
revoke the first because it was not properly executed. It further
held that, although he canceled the first will by having it torn
up, he only intended to do so, not by tearing it up, but by the
later will. The Lord Chancellor held the tearing up might be a
good revocation at law, but said, Ait ought to be relieved
against, and the will set up again in equity, under the head of
mistake.@11 In other words, the testator made a mistake which
equity may correct. The defendants in Ford v. de Pontes12
explained the decision thusly: A...[tearing up the first will]
was done from an opinion that the second will had actually
revoked the first, which induced the testator to tear that as of
9

Id., at p. 357.

10

Supra, footnote 3.

11

23 Eng. Rep. 1085 (1716)

12

54 Eng. Rep. 1012 (1861).
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no use; therefore, if the first was not effectually revoked by
the second, neither ought the act of tearing the first to revoke
it.@13
In Ford v. de Pontes,14 the court followed one of the
holding in the Onions case in a different context. There, the
testatrix executed a will devising real estate to Mr. de Pontes.
She later executed deeds of the real estate to him. It was argued
that the deeds were void because they were executed in
consideration of future cohabitation between persons who were
incapable of contracting a legal marriage.15 The court held that
the deeds, regardless of whether they were invalid as being
turpis contractus,16 did not revoke the will. The applicable
Wills Act required that wills be revoked in a certain manner and
the deeds were not so executed.17 He followed Onions in that an
improperly executed instrument cannot revoke a properly executed
will.
It is uncontroverted that an effective revocation of a will
must consist of an act done co-existent with the intent to
13

Id., at p. 1018

14

Supra, footnote 12.

15

She was validly married in England but divorced in Scotland,
the divorce being declared invalid after her death.
16

An immoral or iniquitous contract. Black’s Law Dictionary,
6th Ed. 1990, p. 1517.
17

A...[By] this section of the Act...a will can only be
revoked by marriage, by express declaration in writing, or by
burning, &c.@ Supra, footnote 12, at p. 1020.
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revoke. Absent that Amarriage,@ there is no revocation. In Baucum
v. Harper18, the court found the following instruction was not
error:
Joint operation of act and intention is
necessary to revoke a will. The destroying of
a will without intention to revoke it would
not revoke the will, neither would the
intention to destroy a will without actually
doing so revoke the will; there must be
both.19
IV

WHEN DRR SHOULD NOT BE AN ISSUE
It must be remembered that DRR does not apply to correcting

a mistake as to the contents of the will,20 nor to correcting an
omission of a provision not in a will. Historically, courts would
not correct such a mistake or omission,21 although Professor
Langbein points out that “[l]eading modern authority in a number
of American states has now reversed the strict compliance and no
18

168 S.E. 27 (Ga. 1933)

19

Id., at p. 29; see also. T. Atkinson, Atkinson on Wills, §
84, p. 421: “An oral attempt to revoke a will is inoperative
however unquestionable the intent may be, unless attended by the
requisite statutory manifestations,” i.e., an act. And at § 84,
p. 421: “The testator’s physical acts which comply with the
statute do not by themselves constitute a revocation. In addition
there must be an intention to revoke.”
“All the destroying in the world, without intention, will
not revoke a will; nor all the intention in the world, without
destroying.” Cheese v. Lovejoy, 2 P.D. 251.
20

Estate of Barker, 448 So.2d 28 (1st DCA, Fla. 1984). DRR did
not apply to revive a prior will where second will was validly
executed, expressly revoked prior wills but omitted a residuary
clause.
21

See Gray, Striking Words Out of a Will, 26 Harv. L. Rev. 212
(1912-13).
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reformation rules.”22
DRR does not apply when the second will cannot be probated
for one reason or another and the first will has not been
physically revoked. The first will stands unrevoked and is the
valid, probatable instrument. Thus it would appear that the
manner of revocation of the first instrument is important. Merely
having a second ineffective will should not bring DRR into play.
For example, in First Union National Bank of Florida v.
Mizell,23 Mr. Mizell properly executed his will in 1978. In 1991,
after contracting AIDS, his health began to deteriorate. In 1993,
he executed a will but did not tear up or destroy the first one.
The trial court held that the 1993 will was procured through
undue influence, that Mizell was incompetent at the time, and
that the 1978 will was revoked by the express revocation clause
in the 1993 will. The appeals court reversed, holding the 1978
will was not revoked by the 1993 will, even though it contained a
clause expressly revoking the 1978 will. Since the 1993 will was
invalid because of Mizell=s incompetency,24 it could not revoke

22

John H. Langbein, Curing Execution Errors and Mistaken Terms
in Wills, 18 Prob. & Prop. 28, 29. See, for example, Erickson v.
Erickson, 716 A.2d 92 (Conn. 1998), where the court adopted Judge
Peters= dissent in Connecticut Junior Republic v. Sharon
Hospital, 488 A.2d 190 (Conn. 1982) and held that the will may be
corrected for a mistake where it is established by clear and
convincing evidence. This does not mean that the court will not
accept parol evidence as to an ambiguous term in the will.
23

807 So.2d 78 (4th D.C.A., FL 2002)

24

The court said the 1978 will could be offered for probate
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the 1978 will. DRR was not discussed - the 1978 will had not been
torn up.25

V

APPLICATION OF DRR
Professor Warren distinguishes Conditional Revocations and

Revocations by Mistake. Condition is defined as a “[p]rovision
making effect of [a] legal instrument contingent upon an
uncertain event.”26 In other words, an event must happen before
the instrument is effective. In the case of a true conditional
revocation, DRR would not be applicable whether or not the
condition occurs. If the condition occurs, the first will is
effectively revoked; if it does not, the first will remains valid
and DRR would not be applicable.27 In Bradish v. McClellan,28 the
testator executed two wills, about one and one-half years apart,
the latter of which contained charitable bequests. Shortly after
but its validity could be contested in further proceedings. Id.,
at 80.
Nor would DRR apply where the testator accidentally destroys
his will believing he is destroying some other document - the
necessary intent to destroy is clearly lacking.25 Professor
Warren calls this a “Conditional Revocation by Act to the
Document” and states that the document is not affected. John
Warren, supra, footnote 4, at p. 338.
25

26

Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Ed., (1990), p. 293.

27

“The intent is not to revoke absolutely but only in case
that some future event happens. There should be no difficulty
about this sort of provision. The revocation operates if the
condition is fulfilled, but not if the contrary should prove to
be the case.” Atkinson on Wills 2d Ed. (1953) § 88, p. 453.
28

13 W.N.C. 3 (Pa. 1882).
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executing the second, he executed a third writing purporting to
be a codicil. It provided that if he died within three calendar
months of executing the second will, the first should go into
effect, otherwise the second would be his will. He died within
ten days of executing the second will. The court said, “[a]s he
died before [the designated date] the [second writing] did not
take effect.”29
A true condition is also illustrated in In re DeCoster’s
Will.30 Testatrix executed a will leaving one-fourth of her
estate of her son. She later prepared a handwritten codicil
changing that bequest and substituted her daughters for her son.
In that codicil she stated the changes would be effective if she
died before the codicil was properly drawn by an attorney. The
court said that the effectiveness of the handwritten codicil:
should be construed as meaning [that] until
such superseding instrument drawn by an
attorney, [it] should become effective as a
legally valid substitute for the presently
executed
document....The
[handwritten]
codicil...is
clearly
a
conditional
instrument, the effectiveness of which for
any purpose would terminate upon the taking
effect of the contemplated subsequent codicil
prepared by an attorney.31
On the other hand, a mistake “...exists when a person, under

29

Id., at p. 5.

30

270 N.Y.S. 244 (1934)

31

Id., at p. 810.

9

some erroneous conviction of law or fact, does...some act which,
but for the erroneous conviction, he would not have done....”32
Revocation by mistake can occur where the first instrument is
physically revoked, it being the intent of the testator to have
the second instrument be the valid will. It can also occur in the
reverse case where the testator revokes a valid second will
intending to revive the first will.33
Onions v. Tyrer34 is the classic example of the situation
where the second instrument attempts to entirely revoke the first
but is not valid. The first will was properly executed but
physically revoked. The court held that the first will, although
it was revoked by having been torn up under the mistaken belief
the second was valid, was revived.
Estate of Alburn35 is the classic example of the reverse
case. Decedent executed a will in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, (the
Milwaukee will) in 1955 leaving nothing to her next of kin. In
1959, she moved to Kankakee, Illinois, and executed another will
(the Kankakee will) naming only her brother, giving him less than
one-tenth of his intestate share. She returned to Milwaukee in
32

Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Ed. (1990), p. 1001.

33

“In most cases, it is a revocation caused by mistake of law.
This result has frequently been explained by the fiction of a
condition.” Bowe, Parker & Schoenblum, Page on the Law of Wills
(2003), § 21.57.
34

Supra, footnote 3.

35

118 N.W.2d 919 (Wisc. 1963).
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1960 and tore up her Kankakee will stating she had “got rid of
it.”36 There was testimony that, after the pieces were disposed
of, she said she wanted the 1955 Milwaukee will “to stand.”37 The
court applied DRR to revive the 1959 Kankakee will and admitted
it to probate. The court cited the trial judge’s strong
conviction she did not want to die intestate, she knew a copy of
the Wisconsin will was on file with her attorney, she stated she
wanted the Wisconsin will “to stand,” she took no steps after the
destruction of the Illinois will to make a new will.
We are constrained to conclude that the
[facts are] sufficient evidence to support
the finding that she destroyed the [Kankakee]
will under the mistaken belief that the
[Milwaukee]
will
would
control
the
disposition of her estate.38
In the same circumstances, Powell v. Powell39 did not revive
the first will but revived the second one. The original will gave
testator’s property to his grandson. The later will gave it to
his nephew. After a falling out with his nephew, the testator
destroyed the second will under the mistaken belief that the
first one would be revived. When the testator died, the nephew
offered the first will for probate, contending that DRR was
applicable. The grandson argued that DRR was founded on the
36

Id., at p. 921.

37

Id., at p. 921.

38

Id., at p. 923.

39

L.R. 1 P. & D. 209 (1866).
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desire to carry out the testator’s intention and that an
intestacy would more nearly carry that out. The court disagreed
and revived the second will. In applying DRR, the court said the
“...animus revocandi had only a conditional existence, the
condition being the validity of the paper intended to be
substituted....”40 Since that condition, revival of the first
will, did not occur, there was no revocation. As a result, the
property went to the nephew, clearly an unintended result.
Sometimes a statute prevents the application of DRR. Despite
the same circumstances as Powell v. Powell, a New York statute
stood in the way of the court’s application of DRR to revive the
first will in In re McCaffrey’s Estate.41 The statute42 provided
that if a testator revokes a second will, the first will not be
revived unless it appeared from the terms of the revocation that
he intended to revive the first will43 or unless the first will
is republished. The testator validly executed a will June 20,
1938, and a second will, revoking the first one, December 20,
1938. When found after the death of the testator, the second page
of the second will was entirely obliterated by ink markings and
at its end the testator had written that “any copy or duplicate

40

Id., page number not available.

41

20 N.Y.S.2d 178 (1940).

42

Section 41 of the Decedent Estate Law.

43

This appears to be a slight variation of Uniform Probate
Code 11th Ed., § 2-509, Revival of a Revoked Will.
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is hereby annulled and cancelled – that a Will dated June 20,
1938 may now be restored to full force and effect.”44 The court
construed the statute strictly and said, “[t]he history of our
statutes, the decisions and our public policy exclude the
existence of the doctrine of dependent relative revocation as a
rule of law in this State.”45 The court also found there was no
indication as to when the notation was made and said, in effect,
it could not determine that the testator’s intent to revive the
first will appeared at the time of the revocation. The result of
this case should be questioned because the intent of the testator
was evident.
Arkansas had a similar statute.

In Larrick v. Larrick,46

the testator destroyed his 1978 will shortly before he died
suddenly in June 1979, and before having the opportunity to sign
a new one. There was evidence that he was planning to make a new
will, even before he destroyed the 1978 will, to the extent of
telling a beneficiary of a planned bequest. The Probate Court
applied DRR and revived the 1978 will. Although the appellate
court discussed DRR, it reversed the Probate Court based on an
Arkansas statute which provides a revoked will can only be
revived by re-execution or by execution of another will

44

Supra, footnote 41, at p. 181.

45

Supra, footnote 41, at p. 189.

46

607 S.W.2d 92 (Ark. 1980).
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incorporating the old will by reference.47

VI

DRR GOING ASTRAY
Because of the distinction between condition and mistake, it

is critical to categorize the facts correctly.48 Although DRR
should be confined to cases of revocations by mistake, courts
have construed the doctrine expansively and applied it where it
was not appropriate.
In In re Kaufman=s Estate49, the testator, while domiciled in
New York, executed a will in 1940. He moved to California and
executed a will there in 1941. The wills were identical except
for a change to a California executor. The testator wrote on the
1940 will, Arevoked by reason of change of residence and
difficulty [of the executor] to come to California and qualify.@50

47

This will not be the result in states that have adopted the
Uniform Probate Code. Section 2-509(a) provides for revival if
the testator, by contemporary or subsequent declarations, intends
the prior will to take effect as executed.
48

“It is, therefore, necessary in each case to study the act
done by the light of the circumstances under which it occurred
and the declarations of the testator with which it may have been
accompanied” Powell v. Powell [L.R.] 1 P&D 209 (1866).
“Nothing but confusion can result from explaining mistake as
condition; just as nothing but confusion can result from
explaining breach of a covenant, impossibility, and the like, as
a condition.” Bowe, Parker & Schoenblum, Page on the Law of Wills
(2003), § 21.57.
49

155 P.2d 831 (Cal. 1945).

50

Id., at p. 833.
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The 1941 will was admitted to probate. However, because he died
within 30 days of executing his new will, it was ineffective by
operation of law under California statutes. Nevertheless, Justice
Traynor applied DRR to revive the 1940 will.
In Kirkeby v. Covenant House,51 the testatrix executed a
will in 1989 placing her estate in a trust. After disposing of
the income, the corpus was to be distributed to a named charity.
In 1992, she revised some of the provisions of the 1989 will,
drafted a handwritten codicil, which, inter alia, named a
different charity. The codicil was not properly executed.

A

month later, she again decided to change her will. She marked
through certain provisions of the will and codicil, added others
and asked a neighbor to type it. When it was done, she signed it.
Afterwards, she had it notarized. Witnesses signed at different
times, not all present at the same time. The testatrix died in
the fall of 1992. The trial court determined that the 1992 will
and codicil were improperly executed, but that the testatrix did
not die intestate. It applied the doctrine of DRR and the
existing 1989 will remained valid and admitted it to probate. It
said:
Under the doctrine of dependent relative
revocation, a court can probate a will that
was revoked by a testator through the
execution of a subsequent will where that
subsequent will is later declared invalid.52
51

970 P.2d 241 (Or.App. 1998).

52

Id., at p. 244 in footnote 5.
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Curiously, no party disputed the application of the
doctrine. While the holding of Onions is not applicable (because
the 1989 will was not torn up), there can be no quarrel with the
result which would be the same if the doctrine were not applied,
i.e., an improperly executed will (or codicil) cannot revoke a
prior properly executed will.
In Churchill v. Allessio,53 the testatrix=s 1984 will was
rejected by the jury for a variety of reasons: the signature was
not hers, or she did not have the capacity to make a will, or she
executed it under duress.54 Another document, dated in 1967, was
found, purporting to be testatrix=s earlier will. The jury found
that although the 1967 will was signed, it was revoked by the
1984 will, but should be Aaccepted@ under the doctrine of DRR.
The Appellate Court agreed to the doctrine’s expansion to a case
in which the earlier will was not destroyed:
The gist of the doctrine [of dependent
relative revocation] is that if a testator
cancels or destroys a will with a present
intention of making a new one immediately and
as a substitute and the new will is not made
or, if made, fails of effect for any reason,
it will be presumed that the testator
preferred the old will to intestacy, and the
old one will be admitted to probate in the
absence
of
evidence
overcoming
the
presumption.55
53

719 A.2d 913 (Conn. 1998).

54

Id., at p. 917.

55

Id., at p. 916.
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Georgia, as well, expanded the doctrine in Warner v.
Reynolds.56 It was agreed that Ms. Warner=s 1990 will was not
properly executed or witnessed. However, her son, left out of
both wills, contended that a 1984 will had been revoked by the
1990 will leaving his mother as an intestate and allowing him to
inherit.

The trier of fact found the 1984 will was the valid and

non-revoked will of Ms. Warner. The Georgia Supreme Court agreed:
...if it is clear that the cancellation and
the making of the new will were parts of one
scheme, and the revocation of the old will
was so related to the making of the new as to
be dependent upon it, then if the new will be
not made, or if made is invalid, the old
will, though canceled, should be given
effect, if its contents can be ascertained in
any legal way....The doctrine of dependent
relative revocation is one of presumed
intent, and it remains the intent of the
testatrix that is the crucial issue.57
In all the above cases, the same result could have been
accomplished by applying the first holding of Onions, that the
second will could not revoke the first because it was not
properly executed, rather than applying DRR. Judge Traynor could
have relied on Onions in the Kauffman case and came to the same
result. Kirkeby=s58 result would have been the same if the court
simply said the 1992 will, because it was invalid, could not have
56

546 S.E.2d 520 (Ga. 2001).

57

Id., at p. 522.

58

Supra, footnote 51.
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revoked the 1989 will. Likewise the result in Churchill59 would
have been the same since the 1967 will could not have been
revoked by the 1984 will since it was inoperative. Warner60 is
another example. There was no reason to apply DRR when the 1990
will could not have been revoked by the 1984 ineffective will.
In the situations described above, it is apparent that DRR
was not applicable because the earlier will was not revoked by an
act - it was still physically intact. To apply DRR in such cases
goes beyond Onions and illustrates the liberal application of the
doctrine. Even though the outcomes in the cases would have been
the same, it is just as important for the correct legal theory to
be applied. Unless the correct legal theory is applied, the
analysis is faulty.
Courts have even expanded Onions to apply to partial
revocations.61 The 1873 English case of Goods of McCabe62 is an
example. The testatrix provided a legacy to her niece, Edith
Galsworthy rather than to testatrix’s sister, Louisa. At the
time, Edith=s mother, Louisa, was seriously ill, thus the desire
to name Edith as a legatee. When Louisa recovered, the testatrix
Aprobably erased or attempted to erase@ Edith=s name from the will
59

Supra, footnote 53.

60

Supra, footnote 56.

61

Some states, e.g., Florida, only allow partial revocation of
wills by an instrument executed with the formalities of a will
and partial revocations by an act are not recognized.
62

(1873) 3 L.R. P.& D. 94.
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and substituted her sister=s name, the substitution not being
valid. The court applied DRR and allowed probate of the will with
Edith=s name restored. The court said:
I cannot have a doubt that she would not have
obliterated the name of that member of her
family of the name of Galsworthy, which
originally stood in the will, if she had not
believed that she could validly substitute
the name of her sister; and if this be so,
the doctrine of dependent relative revocation
is applicable.63
In In re Jones,64 the residuary clause of testator=s 1969
will violated the rule against perpetuities and was held invalid.
The residuary legatees of a valid 1965 will petitioned to
substitute them for the stricken residuary legatees of the valid
1969 will. The appellate court discussed the applicability of DRR
and held that the residuary clause of the 1965 will could be
probated with the valid provisions of the 1969 will under the
doctrine of DRR. Even though prior Florida decisions Afound it
difficult to envision a factual situation other than a codicil
failure where a specific gift failure would result in revival or
preservation of an earlier disposition,@65 the court found the
prerequisites of DRR clearly existed.66 However, given that

63

Page number not available.

64

352 So.2d 1182 (Fla. 1977).

65

Id., at p. 1186.

66

Those prerequisites are: 1) the intent of the testator not
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courts disconnect provisions of a will, the same result could
have been accomplished by holding that 1969's invalid residuary
clause cannot revoke 1965's valid residuary clause, obviating
against application of DRR.67 As pointed out earlier, application
of the proper legal theory is important.
That decision runs contra to the 1865 case of Tupper v.
Tupper.68 There, the testator, a priest, made charitable
bequests. In a later properly executed codicil, he revoked
several of the charitable bequests and substituted other
charities who could not take. The court ruled that although the
substituted beneficiaries could not take, the revocation was
effective because the codicil was properly executed. The court
refused to Aspeculate on whom [the testator] might wish to confer
the benefit@ and distinguished Onions v. Tyrer:
...[I]t may be said that [there] it was the
intention of the testator that the instrument
should operate in an entire and not in a
mutilated form; while in the other cases,
where the testator [as here] has made certain
gifts,
which
are
invalid
in
law,
the
instrument is in a sense operative, but the
to die intestate; 2) the intent of the testator that the
revocation is conditionally qualified on the validity of the new
disposition. Stated another way: the testator prefers the prior
disposition if the new one fails for any reason. Id., at p. 1185.
67

South Carolina applied DRR in the same situation and allowed
the revival of a charitable gift in an earlier will when a change
was made via codicil, which change violated the rule against
perpetuities. Charleston Library Society v. Citizens & Southern
National Bank, 20 S.E.2d 623 (S.C. 1942).
68

69 Eng. Rep. 627 (1855).
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party to take under it is not allowed to
receive the benefit.69
To the same effect is Crosby v. Alton Ochsner Medical
Foundation.70 Testator validly executed a will on January 20,
1971, leaving a bequest to a charity. After the will was
executed, he directed that his September 11, 1970, will be
destroyed. All the provisions in both wills were virtually
identical. However, the bequest to the charity in the second will
violated the state’s Mortmain Statute because the testator died
within 90 days after executing the January 20, 1971, will. The
foundation contended the provision as to the bequest to it in the
1970 will could be revived under DRR. The Chancery Court applied
DRR to revive the charitable bequest under the 1970 will
principally because the provisions in both wills were virtually
identical. The Supreme Court agreed that the charitable bequest
in the 1971 will was void but reversed on the issue of reviving
the charitable bequest under the 1970 will, holding it to be of
no effect. It said:
It is clear from what was said in [a prior]
case that the doctrine of dependent relative
revocation cannot be employed to revive a
will that has been expressly revoked by the
testator when the revocation is expressed in
a subsequent will..., it is conclusive of the
testator’s intent and evidence to show to the
contrary is not admissible.71
69

Id., at p. 628.

70

276 So.2d 661 (Miss. 1973).

71

Id., at p. 669. The court also referred to its earlier
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In so holding, the court cited its earlier decision of Hairston
v. Hairston72 and did not take the suggestion to overrule it. In
Hairston, the testator executed a will in 1841 naming plaintiffs
as beneficiaries. In 1852 he executed a second will naming a
slave girl as principal beneficiary. The next day, he executed a
third will naming the slave girl as beneficiary of his entire
estate and died several hours later. The plaintiffs contended
that their legacy under the 1841 will should be revived under
DRR. The court refused to do so, saying that even though the
slave could not inherit under either of the 1852 wills, the 1841
will was inoperative because it was expressly revoked. The court
pointed out that it was well settled that:
...a will containing the express revocation
clause and duly executed according to the
statute, though prevented from taking effect
for some matter dehors the will...is a
revocation of a former will.73
Maryland=s decision in Arrowsmith v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit
decision in Crawford v. Crawford, 82 So.2d 823 (1955), which held
the result would be the same even if there were no express
revocation clause in the second validly executed instrument.
There the court refused to apply DRR to revive a bequest of the
entire estate to the testator’s sister under his first will. The
second will gave the entire estate to his nephew but the nephew
could not take because he was a witness to the second will. The
result was an intestacy.
72

30 Miss. 276 (1855); the later Pennsylvania case of Price v.
Maxwell, 28 Pa. 23 (1857) is to the same effect.
73

Crosby, supra, footnote 70, at p. 668.
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and Trust Company74 also agrees with the principal of Tupper.
Decedent was donee of a power of appointment under his mother=s
1953 irrevocable deed of trust. He validly exercised the power in
a 1966 will. He expressly revoked that will in a validly executed
1976 will, also exercising the power of appointment. He expressly
revoked the 1976 will in a validly executed 1982 will, also
exercising the power of appointment. The testator died in 1983
and the 1982 will was probated. The trustee of the 1953 trust was
concerned that the exercise of the power in the 1982 will
violated the rule against perpetuities and petitioned the court
for instructions. The lower court agreed and as a result, 80
percent of the 1953 corpus was invalidly appointed. The assets
were ordered to be distributed to the takers in default under the
1953 trust. It held that DRR did not apply to revive the
appointment made under the 1966 will. The appeals court noted
that the traditional purpose of DRR was based on the idea that
courts can correct conditional revocations by the testator.75
A...[T]he doctrine=s underlying theory of conditional revocation
limits the relief which a court can grant.@76 In order to apply

74

545 A.2d 674 (Md. 1988).

75

It is appropriate to note here that the case proves
Professor Warren’s conclusion that there is confusion in the
application of the doctrine. The court speaks in terms of
“conditional revocation” when it should be talking in terms of a
revocation by mistake.
76

Id., at p. 681.
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the doctrine, the court would first have to find that the
testator preferred the 1976 exercise over the 1982 exercise, so
that the 1976 will was never unconditionally revoked - but the
1976 exercise suffered the same invalidity as the 1982 will. To
cure that defect, the court would have to find that the testator
preferred the 1966 exercise over the 1976 exercise, requiring the
1966 will to be probated in its entirety. This the court would
not do.77 The court found that the A...substantial differences
between the wills prevent ruling that the 1966 will was only
conditionally revoked by the 1982 will, even if it were
conditionally revoked by the 1976 will.@78 It is clear that
Maryland through Arrowsmith does not reject the application of
DRR even though A[n]o reported Maryland appellate decision has
ever applied it.@79
DRR has even been applied where there was no second
77

AIt is not the judicial function to select some provisions
from column A and some provisions from column B in order to put
together a valid will.@ Id., at p. 682; APlucking the
perpetuities saving clause from the 1966 will and inserting it in
the 1982 will is inconsistent with the theoretical justification
of the doctrine.@ Id., at p. 680.
78

Id., at p. 683.

79

Id., at p. 679. In favorably citing other cases (In re
Bernard=s Settlement, 1 Ch. 552 (1916); In re Kaufman=s Estate,
155 P.2d 831 (Cal.1945); Charleston Library Society, supra,
footnote 67; Blackford v. Anderson, 286 N.W. 735 (Iowa 1939)),
the court would apparently apply it in an appropriate case. As of
early 1998, Maryland had still not applied the doctrine. See
Kroll v. Nehmer, infra, footnote 90.
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instrument at all. In In the Matter of Raisbeck=s Will,80 the
testator, an attorney, contemplating making a new will, made
penciled alterations of his 1897 will,81 which would give rise to
a presumption of revocation. However, because the new will had
not been drawn, the will as originally written was probated when
he died in 1905, using the doctrine of DRR. The court said it was
a
custom in [the legal] profession unwise as it
may be, to indicate upon the old instrument
the changes that are to be made in the new,
while
the
old
instrument
is
still
in
force....We have unquestionably a presumption
that the testator desired to make a new
will....It is clear that [the testator] did
not intend to die intestate....we can see in
the mind of the testator an intention to hold
to the old will until the new one was an
accomplished fact....The circumstances would
seem to justify the application of the rule
of dependent relative revocation.82
In Dixon v. The Solicitor of the Treasury,83 there was also
no second instrument but the time span between the revocation and
the attempt to make a new will was shorter. Testator executed a
will in 1894. A few days before his death in 1904, he went to his
solicitor to make a new will and gave the solicitor instructions,
his sole purpose being to increase a certain legacy. The
80

102 N.Y.S. 967 (1906).

81

There was no indication as to whether the alterations were
made at one time or over a period of years.
82
Id., at p. 969-970.
83

(1905) P. 42.
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testator, despite the remonstrance of his solicitor, cut off his
signature on the 1894 will, believing such cancellation was a
necessary step preliminary to making a new one. The new will was
prepared, the solicitor using the old one as a model, but the
testator died shortly thereafter and before it was executed. In
instructing the jury, the court said:
It is obvious that the testator intended to
make a new will, and did not intend that the
Crown should take his property. He sent for
his solicitor to take his instructions for a
new will, The testator there and then cut out
his own signature with a pair of scissors. It
was just one of those stupid acts without
which this Court might almost cease to exist.
There is no doubt that the testator did what
he did because he was making a new will....It
follows that he would not have cut out his
signature if he had thought that it would
have
the
effect
of
making
him
die
intestate.84
The jury found the testator did not intend to revoke the will by
cutting out his signature, and that his intent was that the
revocation was conditional on his executing a new will. Thus
without mentioning the doctrine directly, the court effectively
instructed the jury on the theory of DRR.

VII

AINTENT@ OF DRR
It can be seen from the cases beginning with Onions that the

application of DRR is not a mere mechanical act. The historic
intent was paramount there and has remained so. A...[H]e did it
84

Id., page number not available.
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only upon a supposition that he had made a latter [valid]
will....@85 The court viewed the revocation as evidence of a
presumed intent, implied from the circumstances.86 That the
testator’s intent remains a paramount factor is confirmed in In
re Kaufman=s Estate.87 As Justice Traynor stated it: AThe doctrine
is designed to carry out the probable intention of the testator
when there is no reason to suppose that he intended to revoke his
earlier will if the later will became inoperative.@88
This presumed intent89 is expressed in various ways. Kroll
v. Nehmer90 articulates that the testator would have preferred
the revoked will if by its non-revival, his estate would have
passed by intestacy.91 Again, in Arrowsmith:
If a later will which expressly revokes
earlier wills itself fails in whole or in
part, the doctrine requires a court to decide
85

Onions v. Tyrer, supra, footnote 3, at p. 1018.

86

When there is actual evidence that reveals testator=s
intent, the presumption is rebutted and DRR is not applicable. In
re Estate of Laura, 690 A.2d 1011, 1014 (1997).
87

Supra, footnote 49.

88

Id., at p. 833.

89

The presumption is a rebuttable one. AThe application of
this doctrine would give rise to a rebuttable presumption that
the testator would have preferred to revive his earlier
charitable bequests rather than let the property go by
intestacy.@ In re Estate of Pratt, 88 So.2d 499, 501 (Fla. 2d DCA
1977).
90

705 A.2d 716 (Md. 1998).

91

Id., at p. 720.
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whether the decedent would have preferred the
prior will to the result under the later
will, which may be partial invalidity or
intestacy.92
The court in In re Macomber’s Will93 formulated it as
follows: A[t[he rule seeks to avoid intestacy where a will has
once been duly executed and the acts of the testator in relation
to its revocation seem conditional or equivocal.@ And in Pratt v.
Pratt,94 “[t]he application of this doctrine would give rise to
the rebutable presumption that the testator would have preferred
to revive his earlier charitable bequests rather than let the
property go by intestacy.”95
Finally, as Professor Warren observed: A[t]he inquiry should
always be: What would the testator have desired had he been
informed of the true situation?@96 And, “...the revocation is
ineffective if the testator would not have revoked his will had
he known the truth.”97
Pratt98 has language to the same effect:
92

Supra, footnote 74, at p. 681.

93

87 N.Y.S.2d 308, 312 (1949).

94

88 So.2d 499 (Fla. 1956).

95

Id., at p. 501.

96

Supra, footnote 4, p. 345.

97

Dukeminier, Johanson, Lindgren & Sitkoff, 7th Ed., Aspen
Publishers, 2005, p. 259.
98

Supra, footnote 94.
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...if the testator by codicil, revokes a
portion of a prior testamentary instrument
and makes a substituted disposition under a
mistake of fact or law with the result that
the later disposition is invalid, the prior
disposition is revived on the theory that had
the testator not been mistaken in his belief
he would not have revoked the original
gift.99

VIII HOW IS INTENT DETERMINED?
It=s one thing to say that intent controls but another to
discover that intent. Courts have said over and over that, in
their search for the testator=s intent to avoid intestacy, Aall
the surrounding circumstances@100 are considered. Kroll recites
some of the factors:
...the manner in which the existing will was
revoked, whether a new will was actually made
and,
if
so,
how
contemporaneous
the
revocation and the making of the new will
were, parol evidence regarding the testator=s
intentions,
and
the
differences
and
similarities between the old and new wills.101
The similarity of the provisions seem to carry the most

99

Id., at p. 501.

100

In their search, Athe court must confine its inquiry to the
testamentary documents before it without resort to extrinsic
evidence.” Wehrheim v. Golden Pond Assisted Living Facility, 905
So.2d 1002 (Fla. 2005).
101

Supra, footnote 90, p. 722.

29

weight in determining the testator=s intent to avoid intestacy.102
Some examples will confirm this.
In Kaufman,103 the provisions in the two wills were identical
except for the change of executors which was necessitated by the
testator=s move from New York to California. Justice Traynor
said, AWhen a testator repeats the same dispositive plan in a new
will, revocation of the old one by the new is deemed inseparably
related to and dependent upon the legal effectiveness of the
new.@104 He applied DRR because the provisions were virtually
identical.
In Hauck v. Seright,105 the similarity of the provisions of
the testatrix=s October 27, 1992, will and her October 30, 1992
will, were similar enough to allow the revoked October 27 will to
be revived under DRR. The jury found that the testatrix Awas not
free from undue influence...when she executed her October 30,
1992 Will.@106 The Montana Supreme Court found that the wills
102

As early as Onions v. Tyrer, this was a factor: “...and both
wills, as to the main, were much to the same effect, and with
little variation as to the disposition of the real estate.”
Supra, footnote 3, at p. 1085.

103

Supra, footnote 49.

104

Id., at p. 834.

105

964 P.2d 749 (Mt. 1998); there is no indication in the case
that the October 30 will contained an express clause revoking
prior wills.
106

Id., at p. 752.
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differed only as to the relative shares to be received by the
plaintiff and defendant107 and that the lower court did not err by
applying DRR to revive the October 27 will.
Wehrheim108 is to the same effect:
If the later revoked will is sufficiently
similar to the prior will, then the courts
can more easily indulge the presumption that
the testator intended the revocation of the
former will to be conditional on the validity
of the later will and that the testator
prefers the provisions of the former will
over intestacy.
Professor Hirsch agrees with the emphasis given by courts to
similarities in wills as a way of establishing intent:
...[C]ourts...have deemed the revocation of
the
prior
will
conditional
upon
the
effectiveness of the new will, if the prior
will comes closer to the testator=s desired
estate
plan
than
would
intestate
distribution.109
On the other hand, courts will not presume an intent to
avoid intestacy where the provisions in the wills are not
similar. In Arrowsmith,110 the court did not apply DRR because
107

The plaintiff argued that, because the provisions were
Astrikingly dissimilar,@ DRR did not apply and therefore the
earlier October 27 will was revoked. The court commented there
was no authority for this type of reverse application of the
doctrine. Id., at p. 754.
108

Wehrheim, supra, footnote 100, at p. 1008. See also,
Kaufman, supra, footnote 49.

109

Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance Law, Legal Contraptions, and the
Problem of Doctrinal Change, 79 Oregon L. Rev. 527, 555 (2000).
110

Supra, footnote 74.
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A...substantial differences between the wills prevent ruling that
the 1966 will was only conditionally revoked by the 1982 will,
even if it were conditionally revoked by the 1976 will.@111 The
differences were remarkable. Comparing the provisions of the two
wills the court found that the 1966 will appointed $5,000 to each
of sixteen individuals, none of whom took under the 1982 will;
the 1982 will appointed gifts to sixteen charities only two of
which were mentioned in the 1966 will; the 1966 will made no
provision for the testator’s wife, whereas the 1982 will
appointed $10,000 per year to her; his 1966 will made no gifts to
charities from his personal estate, whereas the 1982 will
bequeathed twenty percent to charities; his 1982 will appointed
two trustees instead of the one appointed in his 1966 will.
The result in Rosoff v. Harding112 was the same. There
testatrix executed a power of attorney given her by her brother.
The power was required to be exercised in a specific manner. The
brother died in 1982. After he died, she executed a will in 1982
and exercised the power in accordance with its terms. She
properly executed a second will in 1991 which revoked the 1982
will. That will also properly exercised the power. Her third will
was properly executed in 2000 but did not properly exercise the
power. The court expressly did not apply DRR. It found no
indication that she would prefer its exercise over intestacy and
111

Supra, footnote 74, at p. 683.

112

901 So.2d 1006 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 2005).
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that her entire estate planning scheme was substantially changed
by the last will. The dissimilarities prevented the application
of DRR.
Neither did the court apply DRR in Estate of Tennant.113
There the testatrix executed a will in February, 1972, leaving
specific devises to several charities and the remainder in trust
for scholarships at the local high school. Beginning in 1981 she
hired owners of a yard service and over the next year regarded
their relationship as “more than that of employer and
employee.”114 She executed a new will in August 1982, in favor of
the owners of the yard service. During 1981-1982, her health and
mental state deteriorated. When she died in January 1984, the
1982 will was offered for probate. The court found it was void
for undue influence but did not apply DRR to revive the 1972
will. In order to apply DRR, the court said:
...[A]n essential element of this doctrine is
that the new will and the old will of the
testator must reflect essentially the same
dispositive plan. In the instant case, Mae’s
new will and old will clearly do not reflect
the same dispositive plan.115
The court in so ruling found no evidence that the decedent would
have preferred her property being distributed under the old will
rather than being distributed under the intestacy statute, one of
113

714 P.2d 122 (Mont. 1985).

114

Id., at p. 123.

115

Id., at p. 129.
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the requirements of DRR. The opinion does not provide information
as to her next of kin, only that she had no children and that her
husband had predeceased her. Without that information, it is
difficult to say the court was not correct.
Another important qualification of the rule is that DRR
cannot apply when the destruction is unconditional. In Briscoe v.
Allison,116 the testator tore his will into many parts at the
breakfast table in the presence of his ex-wife and a nephew,
saying “I am tearing my will up.”117 The pieces were left on the
table and were taped together by his ex-wife. After testator’s
death shortly thereafter, the taped together will was offered for
probate. The court did not apply DRR to revive it because “there
is no evidence that the testator at the time he tore his will to
pieces had in mind substituting a new will in its place.”118 There
was some evidence that the testator, about ten months before his
death, wanted to make changes to his will. But the court said,
Just how soon after this revocation he
expected to execute one or the other of these
wills, or some other will, no one can say. In
these circumstances is it not more reasonable
to conclude that he had abandoned the idea
altogether?119

116

290 S.W. 2d 864 (1956).

117

Id., at p. 866.

118

Id., at p. 866.

119

Id., at p. 867.
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The court was correct in Rauschenberger v. Greenwald120 when
it did not apply DRR. The testator executed a will in 1973. He
executed a second will in 1988 expressly revoking his prior will.
It disappeared sometime after it was executed and the time the
testator died. A copy was not admitted to probate. The 1973 will
could not be revived under the Iowa statute but it was argued
that it was revived under DRR, i.e., that the revocation of the
1973 will was conditioned on the 1988 will being effective. The
court disagreed. It said, “There is no evidence of [the
testatrix’s] intent, at the time she wrote her 1988 will, that
the revocation was conditioned on any future contingencies....The
doctrine is inapplicable....”121
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in In re Emernecker’s Estate
did not apply the doctrine even though it said not to apply it
“seems to be a hard case, but there is no remedy, without making
the bad law which such cases are said to invite.”122 The testatrix
properly executed a will in 1903 that left nothing to her
children. Her neighbors convinced her that, to be valid, she had
to leave at least one dollar to disinherit her children. Since
she was “a person of little education and very susceptible to the
influence of her friends and neighbors...,” she tore up and
burned the will. She died about a week later before she could
120

584 N.W.2d 294 (Iowa 1998).

121

Id., at p. 296.

122

67 A. 701, 702 (Pa. 1907).

35

execute another. The court did not apply DRR. It agreed with the
language of the lower court:
She was aware that, until this new will was
executed, she was without any will at all,
and
the
time
of
execution
was
left
indefinite. Her friend was to call the “first
fine day” to go with her to have it drawn.
This
was
merely
the
expression
of
an
unwritten intention to do something in the
future....123
As suggested earlier, there does not appear to be any
consistency in applying DRR resulting in confusion. It has been
applied when there is a true condition, to revive a second will,
to revive a first will when it has not been destroyed, to revive
a first will when the second will was ineffective and could not
have revoked the first will, to partial revocations, and where
there was no second will.
DRR has lost its way. With there being no consistency among
the cases, what assistance can be developed to analyze the facts
so DRR is more easily understood and properly applied? What is
important is that the proper legal theory be applied with the
correct analysis to arrive at a “right” result.

IX

A COHERENT APPROACH TO DRR – A FLOW CHART
An approach begins with the assumption that there is a valid

will. The next step considers whether the second instrument, with
an express revocation clause, is probatable. If there are no
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defects in the instrument, it is clear that the first will is
revoked and DRR would not be applicable even if the second will
is later revoked.
In the event there is a defect in the instrument, it would
not be probatable. The defect could be faulty execution, undue
influence, duress, etc. Then we face the question of what the
testator did with the first will. If it is still in physical
existence, it would not be revoked since an invalid instrument
cannot revoke a validly executed one. DRR would not be applicable
and the first will would be probated.
DRR would come into the discussion when the testator
physically revokes the first will, i.e., he tears it up, he burns
it, etc. At that point there are three alternatives. First, he
did it deliberately without any intent of preparing a new one. In
that instance, the will remains revoked and the testator would
die intestate. Secondly, he did it conditioned on the happening
of a subsequent event, i.e., a true condition. Whether or not the
condition occurs, DRR would not be applicable. If the condition
occurs, the first will is revoked and cannot be revived. If the
condition does not occur, the first will is not revoked. In both
cases, DRR would not be applicable.
Third, he could have physically revoked the first will
because he was mistaken as to a fact or a matter of law. Here is
where DRR is properly applicable. The question becomes what was
123

Id., at p. 702.
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the testator’s presumed intent in revoking the first will? Would
he have revoked it had he known the truth? Was the destruction
and execution of the new will contemporaneous? How close in time
were those acts? Is there one scheme evident in the destruction
of the first will and execution of the new will? How similar are
the provisions in both wills? Would the testator have preferred
intestacy over the first will?
In deciding that question, all the facts and circumstances are
considered. If the facts show the testator intended to revive the
first will, it is probated; otherwise it is not. In the event the
testator does not execute a second will (perhaps because he died
immediately after the will’s destruction), one would proceed with
the analysis asking what the testator’s presumed intent was.
The following Flow Chart is offered:
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X

CONCLUSION
The term DRR has been around for more than two hundred years

and there is probably no inclination to restrict its use. Perhaps
the courts will not ever take Prof Warren=s advice and do away
with that appellation.124 And perhaps courts will continue to
expand the doctrine resulting in more confusion. However, it can
be seen from the Flow Chart that the more important decision is
whether the first will can be revived125, not whether its
revocation can be rescinded. Hopefully the Flow Chart will aid
the proper analysis of the issues and limit the doctrine’s
applicability to the proper situation.
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Restatement of Property (Third) (1996) renames DRR the
Doctrine of Ineffective Revocation, § 4.3, but note that it is
revocation that is still emphasized. Perhaps a better appellation
should be Retroactive Revival.
125

The importance of “revival” is evident from the time of the
doctrine’s origin in Onions v. Tyrer where the court said that
the will, torn up by mistake, “will be set up again in equity.”
Supra, footnote 3.
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